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Abstract
The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) is a well-documented fact of 
empirical equity market research. Theories explain this underpricing with market 
imperfections. We study three empirically relevant IPO mechanisms under almost 
perfect market conditions in the laboratory: a stylized book building approach, 
a closed book auction, and an open book auction. We report underpricing in each 
of these IPO mechanisms. Uncertainty about the aftermarket behavior may partly 
explain IPO excess returns but underpricing persists even in the repeated setting 
where uncertainty is negligible and despite the equilibrium adjustment dynamics, 
that we observe in the data. The data reveal a market-wide impact of investors’ 
reluctance to sell in the aftermarket at a price below the offering price. We conclude 
that a behavioural bias similar to the disposition effect fosters IPO underpricing in 
our setting.
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1 Introduction
The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) is a well-documented fact of 
empirical equity market research. Ritter (2003) reports results from stock exchanges 
in 38 countries, all of which show evidence of first-day abnormal returns. The size 
of IPO underpricing is cyclical; for example, at the height of the dot-com bubble the 
average IPO was underpriced by more than 50%, whereas the long-term average of 
IPO underpricing is 10–20% in the U.S. (see Ljungqvist 2007, Fig. 1). The under-
pricing phenomenon is persistent, even across different IPO mechanisms.
We report a laboratory study on underpricing of IPO. Our data indicate that 
investors’ reluctance to sell their shares at a loss is a driver of IPO underpricing. 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) coined the term disposition effect to describe the 
stylized fact that investors hold on to their losing investments for too long and 
sell their winning investments too early. The disposition effect affects underpric-
ing because IPO investors generally offer their shares for sale in the aftermarket 
only above but not below the IPO price, while shading their demand in the ini-
tial public offering.
The mainstream theories explaining underpricing refer to market imperfec-
tions including information asymmetries regarding the ex-ante uncertainty of 
the issuer’s intrinsic value (e.g. Rock 1986; Beatty and Ritter 1986; Welch 1992; 
see the literature review in Sect.  2). The present paper challenges the market 
imperfection account by reporting IPO underpricing in a controlled laboratory 
experiment in which the concerned market imperfections are nonexistent. In 
contrast to IPOs in real-world equity markets (see Sect.  2), there is no infor-
mation asymmetry in the experiment. On the demand side, each investor has 
common information on the fundamentals of the issued security, including its 
expected risk and return. On the supply side, there is no discretion regarding the 
allocation of shares, as an impartial pro-rata scheme is applied. Under identi-
cal ex-ante conditions regarding the number of shares, asset values and market 
liquidity, we compare three relevant IPO mechanisms: two uniform price auc-
tions and a stylized book building procedure. Hence, our setting puts us in a 
situation where almost all the advanced explanations of empirical IPO under-
pricing are not applicable. The only uncertainty that remains for investors in 
our setting is about the aftermarket behavior. This uncertainty is resolved in a 
repeated setting. In the first IPO, subjects receive perfect information about the 
aftermarket conditions, but are inexperienced in trading. In the second IPO, sub-
jects are experienced so that their uncertainty about the aftermarket behavior is 
almost absent.
Our experiment fills a gap in the empirical literature as we observe IPO 
underpricing in (almost) perfect market conditions. Such an IPO experience 
cannot be obtained outside of the lab, because information asymmetry, uncer-
tainty and other market imperfections can never be resolved in the real-world 
financial markets. Observing IPO underpricing in our environment reveals 
that the market imperfections acknowledged in the mainstream theories of 
underpricing may well reinforce underpricing, but that the disposition effect 
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might play an important role as well, i.e. the reluctance of IPO investors to 
sell their shares at a loss which reinforces underpricing of course. In the labo-
ratory, under controlled conditions, we are able to test this behavioral expla-
nation of underpricing.
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we report IPO 
underpricing in each session of each IPO mechanism. This result is striking, as it 
is obtained in absence of real-world imperfections of demand-side induced infor-
mation asymmetries or supply-side driven incentives. This evidence suggests that 
a behavioral bias like the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985) must play a 
role in the IPO. In fact, our comparison of bidding and asking prices in the aftermar-
ket shows that IPO investors are reluctant to realize losses in the aftermarket, thus 
fostering IPO underpricing.1 The extent of underpricing persists even with repeti-
tion. This persistence indicates that despite the largely reduced uncertainty, expe-
rienced investors request the same excess return for IPO participation as inexperi-
enced investors do. Our data also reveal adaptive adjustments to foregone payoffs, as 
net purchasers in the aftermarket of the underpriced IPO increase their participation 
in the subsequent IPO. Our results on IPO underpricing and aftermarket dynam-
ics represent an important contribution to the investigation of IPO underpricing that 
other studies could not offer before.
Second, in contrast to the secondary data literature, our design enables us 
to distinguish two measures of IPO excess returns: underpricing and expected 
excess returns. Underpricing is defined as the IPO return relative to the aver-
age market return without an IPO. This approach accounts for market dynam-
ics. Expected excess return is defined as the IPO return relative to the funda-
mental value, i.e., the constant sum of (discounted) expected future dividends. 
Underpricing can differ from expected excess return because the latter ignores 
market dynamics. With secondary data, expected excess returns are gener-
ally uncertain and can only be approximated with observed prices. This way, 
the laboratory data offer valuable information that cannot directly be retrieved 
from real world data. For the design of our aftermarket we use the standard 
experimental asset market design of Smith et al. (1988), which has served as a 
laboratory work horse of many relevant issues (see Palan 2013 for a survey).2 
Importantly, mispricing persists in markets in the absence of fundamental uncer-
tainty, as beliefs about future market returns need time to move to fundamentals 
(Haruvy et al. 2007; Carle et al. 2019).3 Our baseline treatment, which involves 
1 Kaustia (2004) also suggests that investors’ reluctance to sell may be a likely source of underpricing.
2 More recent experiments of the Smith et  al. design has illuminated the relevance of gender in asset 
markets (Eckel and Fullbrunn 2015, 2017), the relevance of cognitive abilities (Corgnet et al. 2014), the 
relevance of emotions (Breaban and Noussair 2017), and the irrelevance of capital structure (Charness 
and Neugebauer 2019), among other effects (Powell and Shestakova 2017).
3 The design of Smith et al. is however more interesting for our purpose than many other experimental 
asset market settings that may be less prone to mispricing because it involves the trading of a long-lived 
asset claims with and a clearly defined expected dividend stream and thus a clearly defined aftermarket 
value. Our experimental implementation should in fact be less prone to mispricing due to its transpar-
ency (Kirchler et al. 2012) since we continuously inform subjects onscreen of the expected sum of divi-
dend payments than the standard setting, where dividend values are offered only in the instructions. Con-
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continuous trading prior to the aftermarket, accounts for potential excess returns 
in the markets without an IPO. Thus, we measure IPO underpricing relative to 
our baseline treatment. In contrast to non-experimental studies, we are able to 
measure deviations from the fundamental value and, thus, measure expected 
excess returns. Remarkably, our data show that reduced uncertainty about the 
aftermarket affects expected excess returns but not IPO underpricing. Compar-
ing experienced and inexperienced IPO participants, we find that excess returns 
with respect to fundamentals are significantly reduced, as experienced investors 
request a smaller absolute uncertainty premium. However, underpricing relative 
to the baseline treatment persists.
Third, we compare different IPO mechanisms: closed-book auction, open-
book auction, and book building. We find suggestive although inconclusive evi-
dence that in the auctions, underpricing is reduced when compared to our book 
building treatment which seems to be suggested in the literature (Benveniste 
and Busaba 1997; Derrien and Womack 2003); including experimental studies 
(Zhang 2009; Trauten and Langer 2012; Bonini and Voloshyna 2013). In con-
trast to the other experimental designs, our experiment involves an aftermarket 
in which issued shares pay dividends and trade over multiple periods. Our com-
parison of closed-book and open-book auctions shows that dynamic auctions 
with price indication may lead to higher revenues for the seller than sealed bid 
auctions when investors are inexperienced. Our approach extends the experi-
mental tests on multiple-unit auctions, which usually involve non-tradable assets 
in a common-value framework (Kagel and Levin 2002), to tradable claims of 
cash flow. In the framework of Smith et al. (1988), we compare long-term effects 
of our IPO mechanisms on asset pricing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section  2 briefly surveys the literature 
on IPO underpricing. Section 3 presents the experimental design and our test-
able hypotheses. In Sect. 4, we report our experimental results and in Sect. 5 we 
conclude.
2  Literature review
Recent reviews have summarized the explanations of the financial economics lit-
erature on the IPO underpricing phenomenon (Ritter and Welch 2002; Ritter 2003; 
Ljungqvist 2007; Derrien 2010). Most explanations emphasize different types of 
institutional imperfections relating to asymmetric information, most importantly 
Footnote 3 (continued)
tributing to the literature on bubbles in the Smith design, furthermore we investigate whether mispricing 
over the life-time of the asset is different when subjects are endowed with shares, i.e., when they receive 
them as a gift, rather than when they purchase their shares in the IPO. Finally, the Smith et al. asset mar-
ket design still serves as the main work horse most prominently shown recently in top field journals like 
e.g. Charness and Neugebauer (2019), Carle et al. (2019), or Kocher et al (2018) but also in experimental 
economics, e.g. Janssen et al. (2019).
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concerning the ex-ante uncertainty of the issuer’s intrinsic value (Beatty and Ritter 
1986).
Demand-side explanations assume different degrees of information among inves-
tors. Some investors are assumed to be informed about the issuer’s value whereas 
others are uninformed. This asymmetric information leads to oversubscription of 
attractively priced IPOs as both informed and uninformed investors participate in 
the offering, whereas unattractively priced IPOs are only subscribed by uninformed 
investors (Rock 1986). Because uninformed investors’ demand is crowded out in 
attractive IPOs by informed (institutional) investors, while their orders are filled 
with unattractive offerings, uninformed investors’ average returns can be negative. 
This adverse selection problem is known as the winner’s curse problem (Thaler 
1988; Amihud et al. 2003). The winner’s curse problem is intensified by the prefer-
ential allocation rules applied by investment banks that favor institutional investors 
(Cornelli and Goldreich 2001; Aggarwal et al. 2002). Cornelli and Goldreich argue 
that preferential rules are applied by the underwriter to reward informed investors 
for revealing information on the issuer’s value (Benveniste and Spindt 1989). How-
ever, some authors also uncover modes of corruption in relation to the preferential 
allocation rule (Hao 2007; Liu and Ritter 2010). Finally, Kaustia (2004) also con-
jectures the existence of a market-wide psychological bias in IPO underpricing; IPO 
investors are reluctant to realize losses in the aftermarket, therefore, the likelihood 
of price appreciation is high. Our data support this conjecture. In contrast to our 
comparison of bidding and asking data of IPO investors in the immediate aftermar-
ket, Kaustia compares the market transaction volume for prices above and below the 
IPO price for the mid-term period, i.e., 21–508 days after initially going public, for 
the U.S. IPO market during the period 1980–1996.
Supply-side explanations claim that issuers or underwriters willingly underprice 
IPOs. Welch (1992) shows that underpricing mitigates the risk of IPO failure in 
view of the common uncertainty of an issue. Ruud (1993) argues that underpricing 
reduces the underwriter’s costs of price stabilization in the aftermarket.4 Shiller’s 
(1988) impresario hypothesis suggests that investment banks underprice IPOs to 
satisfy their long-term clientele. There are behavioral explanations why the issuer 
does not get upset with underpricing by the underwriter, including the wealth effect 
for executives who participate in price increases through stock compensation plans 
(Loughan and Ritter 2002). In the signaling theory to IPO underpricing (Grinblatt 
and Hwang 1989), however, the issuing company has an interest in a good return for 
initial investors to attract more interest in subsequent seasoned offerings.5 A related 
argument is that the issuer uses the abnormal first-day return as a marketing event to 
4 According to evidence presented by Ellis et al. (2000), underwriters always trade actively in the after-
market. Contrary to the assumption that average stabilization costs are substantial, however, the authors 
find that underwriters’ trading activities are profitable.
5 Michaely and Shaw (1994) find no support for the signaling theory as the data show rather a negative 
than positive correlation between the level of underpricing and the reissue decision. Habib and Ljun-
gqvist (2001) note, however, that the smaller the fraction of the firm sold, the lower is the opportunity 
cost of a big first day run up. They report that many of the 1999–2000 internet IPOs with large first-day 
price jumps disposed of less than 20% of their equity.
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generate greater brand awareness (Demers and Lewellen 2003). Finally, issuers and 
underwriters underprice the IPO to decrease the risk of litigation by disappointed 
shareholders (Tinic 1988).
The reader will notice that all described institutional demand-side and supply-
side issues referred to in the literature (other than behavioral ones) are absent from 
our controlled laboratory study. In our study we test underpricing under almost per-
fect market conditions.
In the literature, the extent of underpricing has been related to the IPO mecha-
nism used; auctions have been associated with lower average first-day returns than 
the book building mechanism (Benveniste and Busaba 1997; Derrien and Womack 
2003; Kutsuna and Smith 2004). Theory has shown that under particular assump-
tions the uniform price auction can be an optimal IPO mechanism (Biais et al. 2002). 
Experimental results show that auctions raise higher IPO revenues than fixed price 
offerings and thus provide some support for this theory, too (Bonini and Voloshyna 
2013). The studies involve common value auctions in the presence (Zhang 2009; 
Bonini and Voloshyna 2013) or absence of (Trauten and Langer 2012) asymmet-
ric information about the underlying value. In contrast to these studies, our design 
involves aftermarket trading, multi-period cash flows, and a control treatment that 
provides us with a market benchmark to measure IPO underpricing. Nevertheless, 
auctions have less than one percent of market share (Ritter 2003). The literature has 
partly accounted for this observation by the interaction between issuance-size and 
the contract-choice decision because smaller offers are more likely to use auctions.6 
Supply side explanations that predict larger underpricing intended by the issuer 
argue in favor of the book building approach. According to DeGeorge et al. (2007), 
for instance, the search for better analyst coverage may also partly explain the will-
ingness of issuers to choose the book building mechanism over auctions.
3  Experimental design
In initial public offerings, information on the prospective cash flows and on the 
intended exchange listing of the securities in the aftermarket is distributed among 
potential investors. Investors are requested to submit a demand schedule that 
includes price and quantity, which determine the IPO price. In our experimental 
design, the structure of both the IPO mechanism and the aftermarket settings is com-
mon information for all participants before the experiment starts, including the num-
ber of market participants, financial endowments, and number of issued shares. Fol-
lowing the IPO, the issued shares are traded in a continuous double auction market 
similar to the stock exchanges around the world.7 Note that across our experimen-
tal IPO institutions the expected values and tradability of assets in the aftermarket 
7 The double auction market institution induces liquid trading at a good turnover and is quite efficient in 
dissemination and aggregation of information (see for instance Friedman and Rust 1993).
6 As a great exception to this rule, Google used the auction mechanism in its recent public offering (see 
Trauten and Langer 2012).
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are constant; only the price mechanism varies systematically. Before we explain the 
mechanisms of our IPO institutions, we describe the aftermarket along with the fun-
damental value in detail.
3.1  Trading and cash flows of issued securities in the aftermarket
In this study, our aftermarket is implemented via the experimental asset market 
design of Smith et al. (1988) which includes cash flows of issued securities in form 
of random dividends after every trading period. Accordingly, nine subjects trade 
18 asset-shares for 15 periods. A share is an entitlement to receive a regular cash 
dividend that is declared and instantly paid out to the shareholders at the end of 
each period. The dividend per share is determined by an independent random draw 
from the set of payoffs {0, 8, 28, 60}, where one money unit represents 0.01 Euro. 
The expected cash dividend per share is thus 24 money units per period. For given 
zero interest rates, the expected asset-value per share is 360 money units in the first 
period; it depreciates by 24 money units per period. After the dividend payment in 
the last period, shares are worthless.
Each of the 15 periods lasts 180 s.8 During this time, subjects trade in an elec-
tronic continuous double auction market with an open order book.9 The bids and 
asking prices are placed in the order book, which is open and common information 
to all subjects. An incoming order leads to an immediate transaction if it confirms 
the best bid or ask on the book, respectively. The transaction price is thus equal 
to the best outstanding order on the book. Upon transaction, the matched order is 
removed from the order book and the transaction price is chronologically recorded 
in the table of historical prices. The cash and shareholdings of buyers and sellers are 
updated upon the transaction. If an incoming order leads to no transaction, however, 
it is ranked and registered on the order book; better and older orders rank above 
worse and newer ones. Orders can be removed from the order book without charge 
by the traders before they lead to a transaction.
At the end of each period, market participants are given information on the cash 
dividend per share, their resulting personal dividend income, their updated holdings 
of cash and shares, and a summary of transaction prices (open, high, low, and close). 
This past information is recorded in the subject’s history table for each past period, 
which is available onscreen during the 15 trading periods. At the experiment’s con-
clusion, participants are paid in cash the amount of their final cash holdings. All 
trades in the experiment are equity financed, that is, short sales and margin pur-
chases are not permitted.
8 Subjects could unanimously vote for early termination, however.
9 See Füllbrunn and Neugebauer (2013) for a detailed description (SSW treatment).
 S. Füllbrunn et al.
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3.2  Experimental treatments: IPO mechanisms
The treatment variable is the IPO mechanism. The experiment makes use of 
between-subjects variation as each subject participates in exactly one treatment, 
which involves two rounds (i.e., repetitions) of the same IPO mechanism. When 
we compare inexperienced with once-experienced behavior, however, we also 
make use of within-subject variation. In each round, which is indicated below by 
index 휏 = {1, 2} , 18 asset shares are issued to market participants. Each subject is 
endowed with eIPO = 1,305 money units and submits a demand schedule to purchase 
asset-shares.10 The IPO purchase price is determined from the aggregate demand 
schedule and shares are placed at a uniform price with the high bidders.
Up to 18 bids submitted by the subject for single asset-shares compose the indi-
vidual demand schedule. The bids are positive integers and the schedules are con-
strained to non-negative cash balances for any clearing price. Thus, upon submis-
sion of each bid, the subject’s budget constraint is checked. Let bk ≥ 1 denote the kth 
highest bid of the subject, the following individual budget constraint must be met for 
each k.
If upon bidding, that constraint (1) is violated, the subject is alerted and the demand 
schedule is not updated until the violation is removed. The IPO market closes after 
240 s. The market demand is computed and the shares are allocated to the bidders 
of the 18 high bids at a uniform price. Ties are broken randomly. If too few bids are 
submitted, the IPO fails.11
In line with empirical practice, the IPO price equals the highest losing bid. Let Bk 
denote the kth highest bid in the market, then:
Theoretical incentives exist to submit bids in line with and close to the individual 
preference-revealing amount (Vickrey 1961).12 We consider three treatments, 
IPO = {CB, OB, BB}, that is, closed book auction, open book auction, and book 
building, respectively.
(1)k ⋅ bk ≤ eIPO
(2)pIPO0 = B19.
11 There were sufficient bids submitted in each IPO, so all IPOs succeeded in our experimental sessions.
12 As pointed out in Noussair (1995), there are incentives to understate demand for multiple units in auc-
tions with “first rejected bid” pricing (see also Kagel and Levin 2001). These incentives decrease with 
increased competition, however. Due to high demand elasticity that results in our setting from the large 
number of bids/shares-ratio and the relatively large number of bidders, expected deviations from the pref-
erence revealing amount should be negligible (Ausubel and Crampton 2004; Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 
2006). Note that the results of our statistical analysis do not change if the price is fixed at the lowest win-
ning bid. Hence, with unchanged conclusions any point in this interval could be used to determine the 
price.
10 The amount equals the expected value of endowments implemented in the standard Smith et  al. 
(1988) design (see the description in Sect. 3.3 below).
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3.2.1  Closed book auction (CB)
The CB treatment involves a uniform price auction in line with the OpenIPO imple-
mented by WR Hambrecht & Co (DeGeorge et  al. 2010). Subjects submit sealed 
bids, each of which for the purchase of a single asset share. Their own bids are 
recorded onscreen in view of constraint (1). No information is given on the bids 
of other subjects or the likelihood of winning during the auction. After all subjects 
have submitted their demand schedules, the IPO purchase price is determined given 
the aggregate demand. Asset-shares are placed with the submitters of the winning 
bids, Bk: k ≤ 18 respecting Eq. (2).
3.2.2  Open book auction (OB)
The OB treatment involves similar rules to the CB regarding bidding, price deter-
mination and the allocation of shares to the winning bidders. During the auction, 
however, subjects receive updated real-time information on the purchase price, B19 
and all rejected bids Bk < B19. OB is a dynamic auction in which bidders can react 
to the submitted bids of the others. If individual valuations are independent, such 
dynamics must not necessarily affect the bidding and the expected IPO purchase 
price (Vickrey 1961). Nevertheless, if bids are indications of prices in the asset mar-
ket, such a revelation of the bids can help to decrease uncertainty about future prices 
and thus aid price discovery in the IPO. The difference between the IPO price and 
the aftermarket price might be reduced relative to the other treatments.
One potential adverse effect of the OB is an encouragement of early signaling 
and late bidding. A late-bidding effect has been documented for single-unit dynamic 
auctions with a fixed deadline (Roth and Ockenfels 2002; Füllbrunn and Sadrieh 
2012). In a related open auction format but with a multi-unit discriminative auction 
for certificates of deposits such an effect has not been confirmed (Chiang and Kung 
2005). For multi-unit uniform price auctions we are the first to investigate the late 
bidding effect (see the online appendix).
3.2.3  Book building (BB)
The book building-BB treatment represents a stylized book building approach 
involving a two-stage procedure. The first stage involves the closed-book IPO price 
determination rule equivalently to the CB treatment. Every subject submits a sealed 
demand-schedule involving up to 18 bids for multiple assets in agreement with 
Eq. (1). The IPO purchase price is fixed according to Eq. (2) in the first stage and is 
publicly announced in the second stage. Upon the announcement, investors state the 
number of shares they are willing to acquire at that fixed price. Shares are allocated 
according to a probabilistic pro-rata rule; each share request is equally considered 
and the winning bids are randomly drawn. The quantity demand of the second stage 
is individually limited to the number of bids submitted in the first stage. Thus, sub-
mission is encouraged of a maximal number of bids in the first stage. As bids in 
BB have no direct allocation implication, on the other side, incentives exist to low 
ball on bidding in the first stage to induce a lower offering price (as suggested by 
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Ljunqvist 2007). The IPO price in the BB treatment must therefore be expected to be 
lower than in the CB treatment.
3.2.4  Design Justification for IPO Treatments
For the design of our treatment conditions, we focus on two aspects. First, the 
treatment should be close to the existing real-world IPO mechanisms. Second, the 
treatments should be simple for implementation in the laboratory with minimal dif-
ferences across treatments. The closed book auction comes very close to the stand-
ard IPO auction in the real world. Indeed, the experiment uses a smaller lot size, a 
shorter submission period and sets a reserve price of zero. The open book auction 
is a potentially interesting IPO format,13 but direct revelation of price information 
has been rather exceptional in real world public offerings. During the IPO auction of 
Health Communications Network and Charos Music, the IPO underwriter, Ord Min-
netts’s eCapital auction, repeatedly revealed additional bidding information, includ-
ing average bid price (Jagannathen and Sherman 2006). In related real-world auc-
tions for bond issues WR Hambrecht & Co. typically offers real-time information 
on the development of the market demand curve. Finally, the book building process 
in our experiment with the purpose to determine a fixed offer price is simplified and 
transparent compared to the procedure in the real world. The book runner is usually 
a consortium of investment banks that elicits opinions from institutional investors 
to determine a range for the IPO price and the size of the capital raise. Before the 
first listing on the exchange, this price range is communicated to investors. Based 
on demand, the IPO price and size are fixed during the final days of the IPO. Hence, 
our implementation abstracts from many complications in real-world IPOs.
3.3  The baseline BL treatment
Additionally to the IPO treatments, we consider a baseline-BL treatment. The BL is 
a variant of the design by Smith et al. (1988), including three non-dividend paying 
periods prior to the start of the 15 dividend paying periods. Subjects are randomly 
assigned to one of three income classes; the first three subjects are endowed with 
225 money units and three shares of assets, the second three subjects are endowed 
with 585 money units and two shares of assets, and the last three subjects with 945 
money units and one shares of assets. Hence, including cash and the expected sum of 
dividends, the value of each trader’s endowment is 1305 money units, which equals 
the individual cash endowment in the IPO treatments. Finally, it should be noted 
that in the first dividend paying period—the aftermarket in the IPO treatments—the 
fundamental value equals 360 money units in each of our treatments. This treatment 
13 It is interesting, because Google’s IPO was initially planned to be carried out on the eBay online auc-
tion platform. Furthermore, some bidding information is probably leaked between investors in closed 
book IPOs through internet forums or private communication (as suggested in the theory of Welch 
1992). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate this potential IPO setting.
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serves as a benchmark, i.e. we measure underpricing in the IPO treatments relative 
to underpricing in BL (which will be discussed in the next section).
3.4  Return measures
To measure underpricing, in line with the literature, we focus on the aftermarket 
excess return of the IPO. For this purpose, we start by measuring the return in round 
휏 = {1, 2} of treatment {CB, OB, BB, BL} by the capital gains yield:
where p0,τ denotes the IPO price and the closing price of the last pre-period in BL, 
respectively. For the aftermarket reference price p1,τ we consider the average period 
price throughout the paper; other reference prices in the aftermarket–the median 
price, the closing price, and the bid-ask midpoint in line with DeGeorge et  al. 
(2010)—do not change the results (see online appendix section 2).14 IPO underpric-
ing in each cohort is then defined by the difference between IPO return and average 
baseline return:
where the super index IPO represents each considered treatment but BL. This def-
inition, which is in line with the IPO literature (e.g., DeGeorge 2010), takes into 
account that the capital gains yield in the first period could be influenced by infor-
mation processing of subjects about ex-ante uncertainties in the market including 
other subjects’ beliefs and risk preferences. Hence, we adjust for the return in a non-
IPO setting in which the benchmark p0,τ is formed already by the market in previous 
periods.15 In contrast to other experimental studies, our experimental design con-
tains an aftermarket and a control treatment that enable us to measure underpricing 
in accordance with (2).
In contrast to real-world markets, our experimental setting enables us to meas-
ure expected excess returns by the price deviations from the fundamental value. 
The a priori asset value per share in terms of (discounted) sum of expected divi-
dend payments is 360 money units in each treatment prior to the first dividend 
payment because the risk-free interest rate is zero in our experiment. Hence, we 
(3)R⋅
휏
=
p1,휏 − p0,휏
p0,휏
(4)Underpricing ∶ XIPO
휏
= RIPO
휏
− RBL
휏
,
15 We choose the closing price of period 0 in BL as relevant benchmark, since at this point of trading 
subjects’ beliefs and preferences should be already integrated in the price. Alternative benchmarks in 
period 0 of BL would shift RBL
휏
 , but would not alter any of our results.
14 In the empirical literature, underpricing refers usually to first day return measures. How this corre-
sponds to a lab setting is unclear. We have chosen the first period with different reference prices as the 
corresponding time frame, as traders face the same information environment while reacting to bids and 
asks in the market either early in the period or later in the period. If we instead of the entire first period 
examine only a fraction of the time, e.g., the first 30 or 60 s of the first period, the underpricing effect is 
the same.
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define the expected excess return of the IPO, xτ by the deviation of IPO price 
from the risk neutral fundamental value.
3.5  Testable hypotheses
In our experiment, investors have common information about the entire proce-
dure of the IPO and the aftermarket. They are symmetrically and transparently 
informed about the dividend distribution and the expected cash flows to equity. 
The market imperfections emphasized in the above surveyed demand side and 
supply side explanations of underpricing are absent. It is a justifiable theoreti-
cal benchmark if we propose that the price should equal the discounted sum of 
expected dividends.
Hypothesis 0 Initial public issues yield no underpricing ( XIPO
휏
= 0 ∀ 휏 ) and IPO 
price equals fundamental value ( x
휏
= 0 ∀ 휏).
However, at least two alternative explanations could justify underpricing even 
in our setting where symmetric and transparent information on the fundamental 
asset value is given: (i) uncertainty of aftermarket behavior and (ii) a market-
wide impact of IPO investors’ reluctance to sell at a loss.
(i)   Traders face strategic uncertainty about the behavior of the others, about asset 
pricing and their opportunities to buy and sell in the aftermarket. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for investors to request an uncertainty premium on IPO investment. 
This uncertainty premium is similar to the adverse selection problem resulting 
in the winner’s curse referred to above, despite the fact that information in our 
setting is symmetric. When subjects are inexperienced, the strategic uncertainty 
about the aftermarket behavior looms larger than when once experienced.
(ii)  Underpricing may be influenced by a psychological bias akin to the disposition 
effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985) according to which investors are reluctant to 
sell below their purchase price. Because in the IPO, every investor pays the same 
asset price, the IPO price thus could be a psychological anchor of the market. 
Allowing for a market-wide impact of the reluctance to sell below the purchase 
price, there is more upside than downside to share appreciation. Hence, we for-
mulate the first alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 There is underpricing in each IPO mechanism and each round, 
XIPO
𝜏
> 0 ∀ IPO, 𝜏.
(5)Expected Excess Return ∶ x휏 =
360 − p0,휏
p0,휏
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In view of (i), one may expect that learning by experience has a decreasing effect 
on underpricing in a repeated IPO. As subjects’ uncertainty about aftermarket 
behavior is reduced in the second IPO once subjects are experienced, the level of 
underpricing should be affected if the driver of underpricing is uncertainty. Earlier 
experimental evidence suggests that subjects learn between market repetitions (as 
most illustratively presented by Haruvy et al. 2007) so that pricing is closer to fun-
damentals once subjects are experienced. We expect also for our IPO treatments that 
market valuation is closer to fundamentals once subjects are experienced; therefore, 
we anticipate a repetition effect on expected excess returns of the IPO with respect 
to fundamentals (2a). This effect may be reinforced by the decreased uncertainty 
about aftermarket trading behavior, which again may result in a decreased uncer-
tainty premium required by the market and thus reduced underpricing (2b).
Hypothesis 2 (a) IPO-investors’ expected excess returns decrease with repetition, 
x2 < x1 , and (b) the level of underpricing decreases with repetition XIPO2 < XIPO1 .
The alternative explanation (ii) does not preclude but does not require a reduction 
of underpricing. A market-wide impact of the reluctance to sell below the purchase 
price implies some degree of persistence of underpricing. To examine whether IPO 
investors are reluctant to sell below their purchase price and take a loss we check the 
asking prices of sellers in the aftermarket. Individual investors’ reluctance to sell at 
a loss relative to their willingness to sell at a gain has been known as the disposition 
effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985). In view of (ii) we state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 Aftermarket asking prices equal or exceed the IPO price.
DeGeorge et al. (2010) report a smaller extent of underpricing in the IPO auction 
mechanism than in the book building mechanism with a fixed-price offering (see 
also Benveniste and Busaba 1997; Zhang 2009; Trauten and Langer 2012; Bonini 
and Voloshyna 2013). A lack of incentive compatibility (Ljunqvist 2007) could be 
the reason for this difference, as low price indications are not necessarily punished. 
In related literature, Levin and Kagel (2001) report evidence that bidding in dynamic 
multi-unit auctions with feedback is closer to the risk neutral equilibrium than bid-
ding without feedback.16 So, demand reduction may play a bigger role in the closed 
book format than in the open book format. Generally, the mechanism used can play 
a role for the pricing of offerings. Based on the referenced evidence we state the next 
hypothesis.
16 With the laboratory approach to pricing of initial public issues, we also contribute to the experimental 
common value auctions literature (Kagel and Levin 2002). Our approach is different in the way the com-
mon value is generated, i.e., by a stream of cash flows and the potential capital gains from trade in the 
aftermarket.
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Hypothesis 4 Owing to price feedback, underpricing may be smaller in OB than 
in CB, and owing to incentive compatibility in CB smaller than in BB treatments, 
XOB
𝜏
< XCB
𝜏
< XBB
𝜏
.
3.6  General experimental procedures
At the beginning of each treatment, subjects are randomly placed at their computer 
terminals. Instructions, including a detailed explanation of the dividend stream, are 
read aloud and questions that arise are answered. Thereafter, participants practice 
trading and learn the interface of the aftermarket trading-platform in a trial period 
without payoff consequences. Next, one dividend stream involving 15 random draws 
is auctioned off in a pen-and-paper second-price sealed-bid auction to remind sub-
jects of the fundamental asset value process.17 The results of this second-price auc-
tion and the realization of the auctioned dividend stream are revealed and privately 
paid out to the winner only at the end of the experimental session. In the instruction 
session, we prepare subjects for trading and the pricing of dividend streams.
The first round starts after the remaining instructions were read aloud. In the IPO, 
the subject’s endowment, including share and cash allocation for the aftermarket, is 
determined; the asset-shares are allocated according to the described mechanisms 
and the IPO price of these assets is subtracted from the subject’s initial cash endow-
ment. After the end of the first round, subjects are asked to repeat the experiment. 
The second round does not include a repetition of the instructions, and no cash or 
shares are carried over from the first to the second round.
We used an experimental currency unit equivalent to 0.01 Euro. At the end of the 
session, the payoff to subjects is the sum of their final cash balances in both rounds 
adding the show-up fee of four Euros.
4  Data and results
4.1  Experimental Setup
Subjects were undergraduate students of the universities at Magdeburg and Bonn. 
Each subject participated in exactly one market involving nine investors. The 
data consist of seven independent observations in each treatment.18 In total 252 
18 Sessions were conducted at the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory (MaXLab) and the Laboratory 
for Experimental Economics at University of Bonn (BonnEconLab). For each treatment, we ran one ses-
sion at the MaXLab with three independent markets and we ran two sessions at the BonnEconLab with 
two independent markets in each of the two sessions, yielding in total seven observations in each treat-
ment.
17 We provided a sheet with 48 dividend streams showing that the average of the sum of dividend 
streams is indeed about 24 per period and 360 in total. Then we auctioned off one dividend stream. 
Instructions can be found in the online appendix.
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participants (= 7 independent markets × 9 participants × 4 treatments) were recruited 
via ORSEE (Greiner 2015) from the pool of economics students who had no prior 
experience with asset market experiments. The experimental software was pro-
grammed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The experimental sessions were com-
pleted within three hours and the participants’ average earnings including the show-
up fee were 32.30  Euros,19 the maximum being 105.60  Euros and the minimum 
10.74 Euros.
4.2  IPO excess returns
4.2.1  Observation 1: EACH IPO treatment shows significant underpricing 
in both rounds
Support In Table 1, the first column records the short-term returns in the BL treat-
ment. We calculate excess returns using the average price of the first period. Returns 
are reported for the first and second repetitions of the experiment, when subjects are 
inexperienced and once-experienced, respectively. We use the one-sample Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test on the sample of seven independent BL observations to check 
whether the returns are significantly different from zero. Returns are positive and 
significantly different from zero for inexperienced subjects. For experienced sub-
jects, average returns in BL are not significantly different from zero. Note the return 
differences between first and second repetition of BL point to differences between 
underpricing and expected excess return (see observation 2). Underpricing is signifi-
cantly different from zero whether subjects are inexperienced or experienced as seen 
in columns (II)–(IV) of the table, jointly with the z-scores of the two-sample test 
and asterisks indicating significant differences. The results of the Mann–Whitney 
two-sample test as reported in columns (II)–(IV) involve seven independent obser-
vations, the test results in column (V) involve 21 independent markets. It is remark-
able that underpricing is positive in each IPO, in each repetition and with respect to 
each reference price.20
4.2.2  Observation (2a): Underpricing is not significantly reduced once experienced
Support The one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test of the null hypothesis 
XIPO
1
≤ XIPO
2
 cannot be rejected in favor of the alternative (Hypothesis 2b) of lower 
underpricing once experienced at any commonly used significance level when no 
19 Being approximately US$ 43.07 at the time we conducted the experiment.
20 In Sect. 2 of the appendix we report in a table the excess returns with different reference prices (bid-
ask midpoint, closing price and median price, similar to DeGeorge 2010), which all confirm observation 
1.
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distinction is made between treatments, i.e., based on 21 markets. Overall, as sug-
gested by the measures recorded in Table  1 (column V), underpricing increases 
rather than decreases from the first to the second IPO. At the treatment level, we 
find underpricing to be significantly reduced in CB ( z = −1.690 ). This reduction, we 
must caution, could be a market reaction to the abnormally high level of underpric-
ing in the first round IPO of the CB treatment. In OB and BB, in contrast, there are 
more independent observations for which the level of underpricing increases rather 
than decreases between rounds. Therefore, our data suggest persistence of under-
pricing between repetitions in OB and BB, and reversion in CB.
We provide further support for this observation with OLS regression results, 
which also show the treatment effect. In the regression, we make use of treatment 
dummies for the BB and CB treatments (where BB = 1 or CB = 1 in those treatments 
and zero otherwise), a regression dummy for experience (where experienced = 1 in 
the second round of the experiment and zero otherwise), and the interaction effect 
between experience and treatments. We report the results in Table A1 of the online 
appendix. Generally, we find no experience effect. Even for the CB treatment, the 
median and average price data suggest no significant repetition effect despite the 
extreme first round underpricing. That being said, the regression results indicate the 
treatment effect as we find reduced underpricing in CB on the basis of the bid-ask 
midpoint and the price at closing.
4.2.3  Observation (2b): IPO‑investors’ expected excess returns are significantly 
positive in both repetitions but decrease once experienced
Support Table 2 records the average expected excess returns as defined in Eq. (3). 
As shown in column (VI), the excess return on the pre-market price in BL is sig-
nificant with inexperienced subjects, but close to zero once experienced. In other 
words, closing prices in period zero of round 2 are almost at fundamental value. 
The expected excess returns on the IPO price are significantly positive in each IPO 
treatment and repetition [see columns (VII)–(X)]. Thus, IPO prices are significantly 
below fundamental value. The overall average expected excess return on the IPO 
price, however, declines significantly from 93 to 47% between rounds (column X). 
The decline in expected excess returns on IPO prices is significant based on the 
reported results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test with 21 observations. The results 
support the testable Hypothesis 2a. At the treatment level, however, the decline in 
expected excess return on the IPO prices between rounds is significant only for the 
CB treatment, but not for the OB and BB treatments. In sum, the general support 
for Hypothesis 2 is weak, and Hypothesis 0 must clearly be rejected, although the 
second-round return in BL is close to zero.
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4.3  Asks and bids in the aftermarket
Having observed that the underpricing in our markets does not vanish (Observa-
tion 2a) we must pose the question why? The empirical literature reports that a psy-
chological bias such as the disposition effect plays a crucial role in the decisions 
of investors (e.g., Odean 1998). In particular, investors are reluctant to realize their 
losses. This behavioral trait is a good candidate theory in support of the underpric-
ing anomaly. If investors collectively refrain from selling their shares below the IPO 
price, prices can only have an upward direction. Towards this quest, we investigate 
the asking pattern of investors in the aftermarket.
4.3.1  Observation 3: Investors exhibit a reluctance to sell shares in the aftermarket 
below the IPO price (disposition effect)
Support In Table 3 we report the total number of asking and bidding prices that 
we observe in the aftermarket of our IPO treatments including market orders; 15% 
and 12% of total orders were market orders (leading to transactions confirming out-
standing limit orders) in the first and second round, respectively. We observe only 
a small minority of asks below the IPO price; the majority of asks are above this 
benchmark. As reference point we note the significantly larger fraction of bids sub-
mitted below the IPO price. Thus our data indicate a systematic imbalance vis-à-vis 
the IPO price on the supply side of the market. The table shows that the frequency 
of bids and asks is similar above the IPO price (bids slightly outnumbering asks), 
but apparently different below the IPO price.21 We observe a total of 27 (2.21%) 
and 2 (0.22%) asking prices below the IPO price in 21 sessions in the first and sec-
ond rounds respectively.
We provide evidence for the significance of the investors’ reluctance to sell at 
a loss in two ways. First, we show that sellers’ asking behavior with respect to the 
IPO price is significantly different from sellers’ asking behavior with respect to the 
benchmark from the BL, i.e., the previous closing price in the control treatment. 
To do so, we compare the conditional relative frequency of asks below IPO price 
in the IPO treatments (3.00% on average in the two rounds) with the conditional 
relative frequency of asks below the latest pre-period price in the baseline treat-
ment (16.10% on average). The difference is significant; the p value of the two-
tailed Mann–Whitney test is 0.047.22 There are significantly more asks submitted 
21 Counting bids and asks, we find they are both equally frequent above the IPO price (p = 0.6764 and 
p = 0.2169). At (p = 0.0032 and p = 0.0048) and below (p = 0.0001 and p = 0.0001) the IPO price, how-
ever, bids are significantly more frequent than asks (p value of two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test of 
first and second IPO on the sample of 21 markets).
22 As with most tests, we only use the independent observations here (21 for the IPO treatments and 7 
for the BL).
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below the prior closing price in the baseline treatment than asks below the IPO 
price in the IPO treatments. Since the expected excess return is significantly posi-
tive in both IPO rounds, we must show it is no level effect. Therefore, we report in 
Table A2 of the online appendix the outcomes of an OLS regression of the number/
share of asks below IPO price on the IPO price-level. Hence, we observe no effect 
of the IPO price-level.
Second, we show by simulation between IPO markets that subjects’ after-mar-
ket asks are correlated with the IPO prices. To show that sellers anchor on the IPO 
price, we take the 21 IPO prices and the ask data for the 21 after markets and count 
the number of times the asks in the aftermarket are below any of the IPO prices. 
If aftermarket asks were independent from IPO-prices then there should be a simi-
lar number of asks below any randomly assigned IPO price. If, instead as we find, 
there are fewer asks below the actual IPO price than below a randomly assigned IPO 
price, it shows that shareholders anchor on the IPO price. We proceed with the fol-
lowing simulation steps. In the first step, the 21 observed IPO prices are exchanged 
between sessions, that is, they are randomly assigned to the sessions (by random 
draw without replacement, see the illustration in Figure A1 in the online appendix), 
while the observed aftermarket asking prices are kept with their sessions. In the sec-
ond step, for each such assignation of random-sample IPO prices with actual after-
market asking prices we count and total over our 21 sessions the number of asks that 
are below the randomly assigned IPO prices. Repeating 100,000 times the steps 1 
and 2 we create a random distribution of number of asks below random IPO prices. 
(In Figure A1, we illustrate in an example the second simulation step, and we give 
more details on how the simulations lead to the random distributions displayed in 
Fig. 1).
Figure  1 exhibits this distribution of the number of asks below the shuf-
fled IPO prices for the first round of IPO price and aftermarket asks. Only 2 
of 100,000 (0.002%) such simulations produce outcomes as extreme as, or 
more extreme than, the 2.21% reported for the first repetition. For the second 
round, 4.91% (8.30%) of the outcomes are (as extreme as, or) more extreme than 
the reported outcome of 0.22%.23 As a similarly extreme outcome as the one 
observed thus is unlikely to have occurred by chance, we conclude that sellers 
anchor on the IPO prices when they submit their asking prices or when they 
accept an outstanding bid.
23 The observed data involves only two asking prices below the IPO price (0.22% see Table 4), includ-
ing one submitted ask and one accepted bid below the realized IPO price. Both the accepted bid (market 
order) and the submitted ask (limit order) were submitted within seconds by the same seller in the same 
session.
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4.4  Comparing first‑period and multiperiod performance of asset prices 
across IPO treatments
In the following, we compare market performance between treatments. First, we 
consider the first-period effect, i.e., the difference across treatments during the after-
market (period 1). Then we consider the multiperiod effect (for period 1–15), i.e., 
we compare standard return and bubble measures across treatments.
For the aftermarket, we analyze whether the predicted ordering of excess returns 
across treatments is in accordance with Hypothesis 4 ( XOB
𝜏
< XCB
𝜏
< XBB
𝜏
 ). The treat-
ment averages in Table 1 suggest a support of Hypothesis 4 for both rounds. How-
ever, making use of the Jonckheere–Terpstra test of ordered alternatives for these 
treatments, we cannot confirm this hypothesis at all conventional significance lev-
els.24 Given the number of independent observations under consideration we never-
theless take the test results as suggestive evidence in favor of Hypothesis 4.
The empirical literature on initial public offerings has identified two mar-
ket anomalies; short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance (e.g., 
Loughran and Ritter 1995).25 Above we have reported underpricing in the aftermar-
ket. In this subsection, we briefly turn our attention to the performance of the assets 
in the multiple periods following the aftermarket. To examine if the two anomalies 
are related, we proceed in two ways. First, we analyze the multiperiod asset returns 
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Fig. 1  Simulated distribution of asks below IPO price (round 1 left; round 2 right)
24 The one-tailed Jonckheere–Terpstra test yields the following p values for round 1 and 2, respectively, 
validating the order of treatments vis-à-vis underpricing with respect to the following reference prices: 
closing price (0.083; 0.074), median (0.057; 0.129), average (0.057; 0.129), bid-ask-midpoint (0.038; 
0.065). The alternative hypothesis of the Jonckheere–Terpstra test suggests the order of excess returns in 
line with Hypothesis 4, while the null hypothesis assumes the opposite, that is, XOB
휏
≥ XCB
휏
≥ XBB
휏
.
25 In fact, the literature talks about a third anomaly called “hot issue market“, that describes the real 
world cycles in both IPO volume and underpricing. With regards to underperformance, Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) report a 20% underperformance over 3 years (or until delisting) of US IPOs relative to the 
regular market in the period 1970–1990. Underperformance is measured over the time horizon following 
the IPO on the basis of the closing price on the first day of trading in the secondary market.
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Table 2  Expected excess return 
on IPO price
The average expected excess return x is the difference of price and 
fundamental value, as defined in Eq. (3). Round index  = {1; 2} indi-
cates subjects when inexperienced and once experienced, respec-
tively. Wilcoxon signed ranks test results are recorded. Standard 
normal z-scores are in parentheses, two-tailed significance levels are 
indicated by asterisks ***α = 1%; **α = 5%; *α = 10%
(VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Round 휏 xBL휏 xOB휏 xCB휏 xBB휏 xIPO휏
1 33%**
(2.371)
31%**
(2.371)
135%**
(2.371)
112%**
(2.366)
93%***
(4.015)
2 − 0.8%
(− 0.677)
37%**
(2.366)
40%**
(2.366)
63%**
(2.371)
47%***
(4.016)
Difference 
between 
rounds
− 34%**
(− 2.366)
5.5%
(0.000)
− 96%**
(− 2.366)
− 49%
(− 1.183)
− 46%**
(− 2.450)
Table 3  Aftermarket asks and 
bids relative to IPO price
Recorded numbers of asking prices and bids (%) include limit and 
market orders. Total number of valid bids and asks are in the bottom 
line
Round 1 Round 2
Asks above IPO price 37.04 41.50
Asks at IPO price 0.41 0.00
Asks below IPO price 2.21 0.22
Bids above IPO price 39.74 46.64
Bids at IPO price 2.29 1.12
Bids below IPO price 18.32 10.51
Total # bids and asks 1223 894
Table 1  IPO underpricing
First-period average returns of the Baseline treatment, RBL
휏
 are recorded in column (I). We report in col-
umns (II)–(IV) the realized excess returns of the IPO treatments with the average price as the reference, 
as defined in Eq. (2). Column (V) reports the average excess return from all IPO treatments taken into 
account. Round index  = {1; 2} indicates subjects when inexperienced and once experienced, respec-
tively. Significant results of the Mann–Whitney test and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are recorded in col-
umns (II)–(V) and (I), respectively. Standard normal z-scores are recorded in parenthesis. Two-tailed sig-
nificance levels are indicated by asterisks ***α = 1%; **α = 5%; *α = 10%
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Round 휏 RBL
휏
X
OB
휏
X
CB
휏
X
BB
휏
X
IPO
휏
1 5.5%**
(2.197)
14.2%***
(2.747)
50.1%***
(2.875)
53.6%***
(2.747)
35.9%***
(2.747)
2 − 1.0%**
(− 2.156)
33.9%***
(3.137)
32.3%***
(3.137)
57.1%***
(3.137)
40.7%***
(3.137)
Difference between 
rounds
− 6.5%
(− .947)
20%**
(2.028)
− 18%*
(− 1.690)
3.5%
(1.183)
4.8%
(.156)
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in line with the standard finance literature. Second, we discuss overpricing and mis-
pricing measures as proposed in the experimental asset markets literature (e.g. Palan 
2013; Powell and Shestakova 2017).
1. To check for multiperiod underperformance, we take the closing price of the first 
period P1 as the point of reference to compute the investment period return (IPR) 
of the asset for each possible investment period following the first-period market 
closing.
∑
D
휃
 denotes the sum of received dividends prior to period t = {2,…T}, T = 25, 
and P̄t is the average price of the period. Comparing IPRt for each period t 
between BL and the IPO treatments, we find that all p values of the Mann–Whit-
ney test exceed the 20% level for each investment period t in the first and the 
second repetition. Indeed, with our experimental data we are able to compare 
also the expected investment period returns between BL and the IPO treatments 
considering the expected rather than the realized dividend yield. The result is 
very similar. We find no significant difference in expected returns for any invest-
ment period in either round.26
2. A common way of examining the multiperiod performance in asset market experi-
ments is by measuring the average distance of realized prices from the fundamen-
tal dividend value. We report the two measures introduced by Powell (2016); the 
Geometric Deviation (GD) and the Geometric Absolute Deviation (GAD),
where P̄t denotes the average price and FVt =
∑T−t+1
s=1
EDs denotes the (funda-
mental) expected dividend value in t.27 GD measures average overpricing, e.g., a 
value of + 0.2 or − 0.2 indicates that the asset is on average overvalued or under-
valued by 20%, respectively. GAD measures average mispricing, for instance, a 
value of 0.2 indicates that the average price differs on average by 20% from the 
fundamental value. In Table 4, we report the measures for each cohort and aver-
ages for each treatment. Conducting two-sample Mann–Whitney tests, we find 
(6)IPRt =
P̄t − P1 +
∑t−1
𝜃=1
D
𝜃
P1
(7)GD =
(
T∏
t=1
Pt
FVt
)1∕T
− 1
(8)GAD = exp
(
1
15
T∑
t=1
||||||ln
(
Pt
FVt
)||||||
)
− 1
27 For ease of comparison, the reader finds bubble measures suggested by Stöckl et  al. (2010) in the 
online appendix, Sect. 5.
26 The two-tailed Mann–Whitney test returns p values 0.9365 and 0.7947 for the first and the second 
round.
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no significant difference across treatments.28 For illustration, Fig. 2 depicts the 
price trajectories of each session and the treatment aggregations. As shown, we 
observe pricing above fundamental dividend value in most sessions in the first 
round but in fewer ones in the second round. However, there is no systematic 
difference comparing the treatments. In line with the literature in this experi-
mental asset market design (Palan 2013), we find a significant experience effect 
as the level of overpricing decreases with repetition.29 To conclude, we find no 
differences in multiperiod performance across treatments. Hence, we observe 
IPO underpricing but no multiperiod underperformance in our experiment. 
Table 4  Bubble measures
Depicts bubble measures Geometric Deviation as in (6) and Geometric absolute deviation as in (7). In 
periods without transactions we geometrically interpolated the price. According to 
P
t
= FV
t
√
P
t−1
FV
t−1
×
P
t}+1
FV
t}+1
BL Round 1 Round 2 CB Round 1 Round 2
Session# GD GAD GD GAD Session# GD GAD GD GAD
22 0.55 0.55 0.15 0.15 1 0.65 0.72 0.23 0.28
23 0.34 0.42 − 0.01 0.19 2 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.04
24 0.22 0.23 0.04 0.08 3 0.29 0.42 0.11 0.20
25 1.00 1.04 0.67 0.69 11 0.24 0.36 0.01 0.02
26 0.30 0.72 0.14 0.22 12 0.54 0.64 0.12 0.25
27 0.15 0.20 − 0.02 0.07 17 0.37 0.52 0.02 0.15
28 0.20 0.24 0.08 0.09 18 0.19 0.29 − 0.04 0.09
Average 0.39 0.49 0.15 0.21 Average 0.35 0.45 0.07 0.15
OB Round 1 Round 2 BB Round 1 Round 2
Session# GD GAD GD GAD Session# GD GAD GD GAD
7 0.69 0.88 0.23 0.52 4 1.10 1.20 0.81 0.85
8 0.34 0.41 0.06 0.07 5 0.79 0.81 0.12 0.21
13 0.52 0.52 0.01 0.06 6 0.20 0.43 − 0.01 0.08
14 0.18 0.50 0.07 0.12 9 0.49 0.49 − 0.11 0.20
19 0.20 0.24 0.07 0.11 10 0.19 0.27 − 0.03 0.08
21 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.02 15 1.43 1.43 0.41 0.43
20 0.79 0.82 0.33 0.48 16 0.24 0.29 0.06 0.06
Average 0.40 0.50 0.11 0.20 Average 0.64 0.70 0.18 0.27
28 We consider the two-tailed Mann–Whitney test with seven observations for the BL treatment and 21 
observations for the IPO treatment. P values of GD and GAD tests are 0.853, 0.614 and 0.730, 0.811 in 
first and second round. A Kruskal–Wallis test on treatment level also shows no significant difference of 
bubble measures across treatments (p > 0.6 for all four comparisons).
29 The Wilcoxon signed rank test suggests that the second round GD and GAD are significantly smaller 
than the first round GD and GAD (p = 0.018 in BL and p < 0.001 in the IPO treatments, similar for both 
measures).
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5  Summary
In our laboratory study, we have investigated the behavior of prices in initial public 
offerings and the aftermarket. In contrast to other empirical studies we measure both 
underpricing relative to the market in absence of an IPO and expected excess returns 
relative to fundamental asset value. Our design eliminates most, if not all, of the 
commonly specified reasons for underpricing (Ritter and Welch 2002; Ritter 2003; 
Ljungqvist 2007: Derrien 2010). Despite our controlled, transparent and symmetric 
laboratory conditions, we observe underpricing in each IPO session and each repeti-
tion. Underpricing persists even as we resolve subjects’ uncertainty in the repeated 
setting, where we expected a decline in underpricing. Comparing aftermarket asking 
Fig. 2  Time series of average transaction prices (continued). Note: The figure depicts average period 
prices of individual markets (grey lines), fundamental value (dashed line), and the median treatment 
price (black line with diamonds) for each period by treatment and round. In periods without transactions 
we geometrically interpolated the prices according to P
t
= FV
t
√
P
t−1
FV
t−1
×
P
t}+1
FV
t}+1
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prices to IPO prices, we find that the average IPO excess return required by investors 
does not decline significantly between repetitions. The decrease in expected excess 
returns that we observe at the same time, however, implies that subjects’ uncertainty 
about aftermarket behavior does impact absolute IPO pricing. Therefore, we con-
clude that uncertainty impacts expected excess returns, but the impact of uncertainty 
on IPO underpricing is much less important than we thought before we turned to the 
data.
Our data suggest that IPO investors are reluctant to realize losses in the aftermar-
ket. We suggest that a market-wide impact of the disposition effect can explain the 
IPO underpricing anomaly in our setting. As all IPO investors have the same pur-
chase price, the reluctance to sell at a loss implies that the IPO price serves as a psy-
chological support level of the aftermarket price. A similar impact was conjectured 
in the work of Kaustia (2004) who examined, starting from day 21, stock turnover 
in US markets over 2 years following the IPO. Kaustia’s observation that turnover is 
Fig. 2  (continued)
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significantly lower for negative initial return IPOs when the stock trades below the 
offer price, and increases significantly on the day the price surpasses the offer price 
for the first time, seems to be related to our observation for positive initial return 
IPOs that asking prices in the aftermarket usually exceed the IPO price.
IPO underpricing is a very robust result in our data, which we observe across 
our three IPO mechanisms. The aftermarket performance is similar across our 
three IPO mechanisms. Further to the reported analyses in this paper, there is an 
online appendix to this paper. There, we report on IPO dynamics (Sect. 4) show-
ing that aftermarket participants increase their IPO participation (see also Kaustia 
and Knüpfer 2008), probably because they regret the opportunity costs they incur 
by purchasing the higher priced shares in the aftermarket of the IPO. This effect 
is in line with learning direction theory (Selten and Buchta 1999;  Neugebauer 
and Selten 2006; Selten and Neugebauer 2019). It contributes to a lower aver-
age expected excess return. Because the required return by IPO investors does 
not decrease, however, underpricing persists. We also observe that subjects in the 
open book auction tend to submit their bids strategically late, eventually rein-
forcing underpricing and demand reduction. Hence, we report late bidding in the 
multi-unit auction as has been done before for single-unit auctions (Ariely et al. 
2005).
In contrast to our finding on persistent underpricing, Weber et al. (2018) report 
initial prices in bond IPOs closer to fundamental values in the fourth repetition. 
Despite the fact that their setting is very different from ours (i.e., uniform-price 
call auction, known dividends), it could be an interesting robustness check in our 
setting to see if underpricing still persists when the number of IPO repetitions 
increases.
From our analysis, we conclude that investor behavior explains the underpric-
ing anomaly, as we observe underpricing under almost perfect market condi-
tions. Further demand-side and supply-side effects as advanced in the literature 
are absent in our design. Those effects might indeed reinforce the empirically 
observed underpricing (see Sect. 2) and deserve further investigation in the labo-
ratory.30 Our design can be adapted to many different questions.
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